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Abstract
This Article examines the loss of the natural law perspective from legal theory and the move-
ment towards liberal theory. The Article continues by analyzing two features of the natural law
tradition as described in the philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyla. The first feature concerns
marriage and family as the fundamental human community. The second considers marriage as
a virtuous relationship. The Article concludes with practical suggestions for the legal profession
and legal education with regard to counseling clients about marriage.
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NATURAL LAW, MARRIAGE, AND THE
THOUGHT OF KAROL WOJTYLA
Rev. John J. Coughlin, O..M.*
INTRODUCTION
At the mid-point of the last century, Dean Roscoe Pound wrote
that the legal profession constituted "a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service." 1 Yet, contrary to this won-
derfully noble appreciation of our profession, lawyers may some-
times take an unreflective and mechanistic approach when
counseling a client who is considering a divorce.2 Over the last five
decades, the national divorce rate has risen to approximately fifty
percent. Recent significant statistical evidence indicates that the
culture of divorce has left neither divorced spouses nor their chil-
dren in a more advantageous situation.4 The natural law tradition
has long perceived a nexus between the general well being of soci-
ety and the health of marriage and family life. In the natural law
* J.C.D., J.C.L., Pontifical Gregorian University; J.D., Harvard Law School;
Th.M., Princeton Theological Seminary; M.A., Columbia University; B.A., Niagara
University. Father Coughlin was a law clerk to the Honorable Francis X. Altimari of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and currently serves as
Assistant Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law and Spiritual Direc-
tor at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N.Y.
1. RoscoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
2. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE, WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETER OFF FINANCIALLY 1
(2000). See also ROBERT H. VASOLI, WHAT GOD HAS JOINED TOGETHER, THE AN-
NULMENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 23-26 (1998) (suggesting that canon
lawyers in the United States have disregarded theological and canonical principles in
order to make annulments widely available to American Catholics).
3. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 2, at 188 citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997 tbl. 145 (117th ed. 1997) (not-
ing statistical indications that during the last years of the twentieth century the na-
tional divorce rate has leveled-off and may be declining slightly).
4. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE, A
25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY 294-316 (2000) (concluding that a twenty-five year longi-
tudinal study showed that the "divorce culture" yields long term negative conse-
quences for individuals, families and society). See also WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra
note 2, at 188 (indicating that married persons, who have never been divorced tend to
be physically emotionally, and financially better off than divorced persons. This dis-
tinction is also true of the progeny of both groups).
5. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 86-87 (1980) (identifying
marriage and family as a fundamental good for society); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORAL-
ITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986) ("Monogamy... cannot be practiced by an individual. It
requires a culture which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public's atti-
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tradition, if marriage is understood as a private, inner experience
rather than an objective social reality, the social foundation is de-
stabilized.6 This essay suggests that natural law affords a more
complete and balanced understanding of marriage and family life
than the present mainstream perspective, which has its roots in lib-
eral theory.7
It is far beyond the modest aims of this essay to provide a com-
plete historical and philosophical analysis of the natural law tradi-
tion on marriage or of the developments that have led to the
demise in the United States of that tradition.8 Rather, I shall dis-
cuss the loss of the natural law perspective from legal theory. Fol-
lowing this prolegomenon, I shall attempt to sketch in broad
strokes two features of the tradition, especially as retrieved in the
philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyla. 9 The first concerns mar-
riage and family as the fundamental human community, and the
second considers marriage as a virtuous relationship. The two fea-
tures are contrasted with certain aspects of the understanding of
tude and through its formal institutions"); KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSI-
BILITY 217 (H. T. Willetts, trans., William Collins Sons & Co. ed., 1981) ("The point of
departure must be the law of nature; legislation concerning the family must objec-
tively express the order implicit in its nature.")
6. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 2, at 10 (claiming that marriage is viewed
"as an inner emotion rather than an outer reality").
7. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW, AMERI-
CAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 115-16 (1987) (describing the influence of
liberalism on the rights language of family law). Liberalism has liberty as its "princi-
pal value." These liberties include: civil, fiscal, political, personal, and domestic liber-
ties. ROBERT SONG, CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY 46 (1997). See also MARY
ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 63-81 (1989) (describing the philo-
sophical change in divorce law during the last decades of the twentieth century).
8. For a discussion of natural law in general, see Ioannes Paulus Pp. II, "Litterae
Encyclicae Veritatis Splendor (Die 6 m. augustis a. 1993)," 85 ACTA APOSTOLICA
SEDIS ("AAS") 1133-1228 (1993) (discussing natural law). To affirm the existence of
the natural law of marriage follows from reflection on human nature, as these univer-
sal and transcendent principles are said to be "written and engraved in the heart of
each and every man." Veritatis Splendor, 44. For a discussion of the role of natural-
law principles in jurisprudence, see generally FINNIS, supra note 5. See also LLOYD L.
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 224-265 (1987). Nonetheless, the role of nat-
ural law is far from settled in contemporary American jurisprudence. The chief objec-
tion to the theory seems to be that "[e]ither the allegedly universal ends are too few
and abstract to give content to the idea of the good, or they are too numerous and
concrete to be truly universal." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE &
POLITICS 241 (1975). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THE-
ORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-54 (1980) (examining natural law).
9. KAROL WOJTYLA, PERSON AND COMMUNITY (Theresa Sandok trans., 1993);
WOJTYLA, supra note 5; KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON (Andrew Potocki
trans., 1979).
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marriage derived from liberal theory. The essay concludes with
practical suggestions for the legal profession and legal education
with regard to counseling clients about marriage.
At the outset, it must be mentioned that this essay is not in-
tended to propose that divorce be eliminated from the law of the
state.' 0 To be sure, it would probably be impossible to return our
present pluralistic society to a time when divorce was not an op-
tion.' Yet the culture of divorce and its consequences for individ-
uals and society indicate that perhaps the legal profession ought to
pause and reflect about the impact of the current state of affairs.12
In contrast to an approach in which the lawyer unreflectively views
facilitating a divorce as a mechanistic procedure, the natural law
alternative suggests, when counseling clients, lawyers might benefit
by appreciating the profundity of the marital relationship. Such an
appreciation would be beneficial in maintaining a balanced per-
spective on what is at stake for individuals, spouses, children, and
society as a whole.
10. Given its roots in medieval canon law, the original common law did not recog-
nize divorce in the modern sense of that term, which indisputably dissolves marriage
and carries with it the right of the parties to marry other persons. Rather, it permitted
only separation, that is divorce a mensa et thoro (literally from table and bed - a soft
form of divorce which is a separation of the parties by law, rather than a dissolution of
the marriage). JOHN WITrE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RE-
LIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 159-161 (1997). During the nine-
teenth century in the United States, the development of divorce jurisdiction tended to
imitate the English system of parliamentary or legislative divorce. Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190 (1888) (upholding the competence of a territorial legislature to dissolve a
marriage through a special act). Gradually, the device of legislative divorce ceded to
judicial jurisdiction with rather limited grounds upon which a suit for divorce might be
brought. For example, in New York State the law permitted divorce only to be
granted on the ground of adultery. Brady v. Brady, 64 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1985)
("Prior to 1966 amendments to the Domestic Relations Law, the sole ground for di-
vorce in this State was adultery.") Since a legislative reform in 1966, New York's
approach has permitted an action for divorce on any one of four fault grounds and
two so-called "no-fault" grounds. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2001).
11. Cf. WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5 at 217 ("[L]egislation
concerning the family must objectively express the order implicit in its nature."). See
also Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The
Ascendancy of Self Over the Marital Community 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 64-75, 94-95
(2001) (observing that "solitary individualism" now characterizes the economics of
marital dissolution).
12. See,e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children At Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of
Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 262 (noting that the risk of
sexual abuse of female children escalates following divorce).
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I. THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITION
During the renaissance of law from the eleventh to the thir-
teenth centuries, the medieval canonists integrated various aspects
of religious and secular thought to create a natural law theory of
marriage.13 The theory held that marriage was a permanent associ-
ation between a man and women intended to nourish the bond of
conjugal love and to enable the procreation and education of chil-
dren.14 Among the principal effects of the new legal theory were
greater equality for the wife; a focus on the mutual and free con-
sent of the spouses as necessary to the validity of marriage; and the
possibility of permanent separation from bed and board in cases of
adultery, desertion or protracted ill treatment. 15 Although the the-
ory was consistent with the Christian view of marriage, it was
thought to stand independent of revelation; it viewed marriage as
an association derived from nature for the good of individuals and
especially for society.1 6
A sea change in the understanding of law itself during the eight-
eenth century belied the general concept of the natural law as well
as its position on marriage. A foundational principle of the com-
mon law recognized that there existed a superior body of law by
the test of which all positive law 17 was to be judged. In application
this meant, for example, that although the sovereign might be
above the positive law, he or she was bound by the natural law. 18
Blackstone wrote that the common law was "founded in principles
that are permanent, uniform and universal.., which every man has
implanted in him.' 9 This view of the common law, which consid-
ered the courts as the depositories of the custom and usage derived
13. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE WEST-
ERN LEGAL TRADITION 225-230 (1983); WIrE, supra note 10, at 22-25 (discussing the
"sacrament of marriage model").
14. WITTE, supra note 10, at 25.
15. BERMAN, supra note 13, at 228-29; WirE, supra note 10, at 160-61.
16. BERMAN, supra note 13, at 228; WirrE, supra note 10, at 25.
17. GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 6 (G. W. Patton & David P.
Derham eds., 4th ed. 1972) (defining positive law as a "general rule of conduct laid
down by a political superior to a political inferior").
18. See generally WEINREB, supra note 8, at 15-126 (discussing the development of
natural law theory through history); see also JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Govern-
ment, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT §135 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) ("The rules that they make for other
men's actions must, as well as their own and other men's actions be conformable to
the law of nature.").
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 846 (1769). After proclaiming that
natural law is a higher law than the common law, Blackstone claimed that Parliament
is omnipotent, and it would seem to follow that an act of the Legislature could over-
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from, or at least consistent with, the natural law, was widely ac-
cepted in the Colonies at the time of the American Revolution.20
It was of particular importance in matters of equity, when a chan-
cellor's decision rested on reason and conscience. 2' In Wightman v.
Wightman, the famed Chancellor James Kent declared a marriage
invalid on the ground of the lack of proper mental capacity of one
of the parties:
That such a marriage is criminal and void by the Law of Nature,
is a point universally conceded. And, by the Law of Nature, I
understand those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator
has prescribed to Man, as a dependent and social being; and
which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason,
though they may be more precisely known, and more explicitly
declared by Divine Revelation. 2
Kent's reasoning reflected the classical notion of natural law as a
set a reciprocal rights and responsibilities inherent in the nature of
each human being and ordered by divine intention to advance the
common good. The classical tradition, however, was gradually
yielding to a new theory of individual rights.
An increasing secularization characterized the approach to legal
and political questions during the "golden century of human rea-
son." 23 The Protestant Reformation had led to a growing call for
turn the natural law. Id. at 51. For a discussion of the common law approach see
PATON, supra note 17 at 119.
20. See, e.g., THE CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
Quincy's Mass. Rep. 110 (1765). The instructions given to the Grand Jury call for the
indictment of participants in a riot against the Stamp Act. Id. at 113. The Chief Jus-
tice instructed: "To relieve the Oppressed, to guard the Innocent, to preserve the
Order of Society, and the Dignity of Government is a noble principle of the Mind.
This is the Duty of every Individual of the Community." Id. at 110. He continued that
the riot offended the "Natural Law, that is, the law which every man has implanted in
him." Id. at 113. See also James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies, in AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 60, 61 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991)
("These are the bonds, which by God and nature are fixed.").
21. 3 GEORGE W. KEETON AND L.A. SHERIDAN, EQuITY 33 (3d ed. 1987). See
also F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 13 (2d ed. 1936) ("Equity is not bound by rules or
precedents, but acts from the opinion of the judge."); John J. Coughlin, 30 STUDIA
CANONICA 406-421 (1996) (describing the historical development of equity by the me-
dieval canonists); Peter H. Schuck, When The Exception Becomes the Rule: Regula-
tory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process,
1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 170 (1984) (discussing distinctions between legal justice and eq-
uity); Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1205-
1206 (1990).
22. 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N.Y. Ch. 1820).
23. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 114 (1959).
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religious freedom as a matter of individual conscience.24 Although
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke acknowledged the validity of nat-
ural law, they considered the human being as a free individual who
entered the social contract. 25 Additionally, the new economic the-
ories of thinkers such as Adam Smith favored individual liberty to
pursue private gain.26 These various influences gave rise to a the-
ory of law that focused on the rights and powers of the individual.
The eighteenth century view of law was in harmony with the lib-
eral theory.27 Government was by the consent of individuals, who
entered a "pactum subiectionis rather than a pactum unionis.' 28
The era witnessed a gradual shift away from the traditional concep-
tion of the common law as a fixed and determinate body of rules
reflecting ancient custom and divinely designed principles. Su-
preme Court Justice James Wilson delivered a series of lectures in
1791, in which he "acknowledged the obligations derived from nat-
ural law," but "reduced them to private questions of conscience. 29
Justice Wilson's view reflected the predominant conception of law
that held that it was the voluntary consent of individual men, in-
stead of the authority of some higher law, which formed the obliga-
tory basis of statutes, custom, and even the natural law itself.30 The
view was consistent with the theory of John Austin, who held that
the state creates the law.31 It marked the waning of the medieval
and common-law conception that the sovereign had power over the
positive law, but was bound by the higher principles of natural jus-
tice. Statutory law passed by the legislature increasingly was
24. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, re-
printed in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 946-47 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
25. See LOCKE, supra note 18, at §§ 143-144, at 364-365; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN 82-84 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1957).
26. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INOUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1778).
27. DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A CRITICISM OF SOME POLITICAL AND
ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS 228 (1894).
28. PATON, supra note 17, at 108.
29. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN Law 19 (1977).
30. HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 19.
31. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSI-
TIVE LAW at 267 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885). Commenting on Austin's con-
cept of law, Hans Kelsen stated: "[I]t can be said that the state creates the law, but
this means only that the law regulates its own creation." Hans Kelsen, The Pure The-
ory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 65 (1941). Kelsen
defined law as "the social technique which consists in bringing about the desired con-
duct of men through the threat of a measure of coercion which is to be applied in
every case of contrary conduct." HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 19 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961). Hence, for Kelsen, the state and the law
are the same, since the state is only the legal order viewed from another direction.
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viewed as supreme, as it was thought best to reflect the consent of
the people. No longer would judges understand their role as the
guardians and interpreters of a higher, transcendent, and immuta-
ble corpus of law. Nor would they continue to understand the
common law as primarily derived from these higher principles in
order to furnish justice in individual cases.32
The transformed view of law led to the prospect that traditional
legal structures, such as the institution of marriage, would be evis-
cerated of the claim to an objective moral value.33 Marriage could
no longer claim a legitimacy based upon its status as a permanent
institution derived from human nature, which transcended cultures
and history.34 To the contrary, the existential human situation at
any given historical and cultural manifestation might give rise to
law that regulated human sexuality and procreation in a variety of
ways.35 In addition to, or theoretically even to the exclusion of,
lasting monogamous relationships between males and females, the
law might recognize as privileged any number of possibilities such
as cohabitation, polygamy, homosexual unions, or some other type
of arrangement. 36 The demise of the natural law tradition as af-
fording the moral predicate for legal structures led to the relativity
of value. It reduced marriage to merely a social convention, which
two individuals elect based upon respective subjective preferences.
I. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY As FUNDAMENTAL COMMUNITY
In contrast to a focus on marriage as a mere social convention
reflective of subjective preference, the natural law tradition consid-
32. HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 30. Rather, they began to function "as equally
responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially desirable
conduct." Id. The new view would ultimately lead to Holmes' realism that "[tjhe life
of the law has not been its logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDEL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1951).
33. See UNGER, supra note 8, at 63 (criticizing liberal political theory on account
of its "inability to arrive at a coherent understanding of the relations between rules
and values in social life").
34. See generally WITTE, supra note 10, at 202-219 (describing the transformation
of Anglo-American marriage law from the nineteenth century to the present day).
35. See e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.")
36. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 435-42 (1992) (arguing on the
basis of economic analysis for societal attitudes and laws that respect a "liberal" ap-
proach to sexuality); WITrE, supra note 10, at 215. But see ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN
DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 139-160 (1999) (arguing that the state should only recog-
nize marriages between mature persons of the opposite sexes who have the capacity
to "consummate marriage as a one-flesh communion").
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ers marriage and family to constitute the most fundamental form of
human community.37 This natural community flows from the unity
of the person as body and spirit and the complementarity of the
sexes.38 From a teleological perspective, the tradition identifies
two inseparable ends of marriage. 39 First, conjugal love, or what
Wojtyla describes as the sensual and spiritual intimacy of the
spouses in marriage, demands a profound justification.40 The
depth of this community requires commitment on the part of the
spouses to a lasting and exclusive fidelity to each other.41 Accord-
ing to Wojtyla, this special form of love elicits from the participant
the total gift of self.42  It yields a kind of human friendship that
prospers in the midst of the joys and sufferings of everyday life.
The second good commences with openness to the procreation
of children.43 As conjugal love flows from the complementarity of
37. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS, bk. 8, ch. 12, 1162a (Richard McKeon
ed. 1941) ("Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is
naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the
household is earlier and more necessary than the city."); WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at
315-327 (discussing the "divine plan" for the family).
38. See generally Wojtyla, supra note 5, at 81 (explaining the need of men and
women for each other in order that each may be completed).
39. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, III, SuPP., q.4 1 a.1, p. 2711 (The
Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers, 1947) (1273)
[hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. Thomistic thought describes two goods of
marriage:
"First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the
offspring. . . . Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony,
which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in
household matters ... For just as natural reason dictates that men should
live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for
which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society
... Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which con-
sists in marriage."
Id.
40. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 222 (noting that Thomistic thought emphasized the
primacy of procreation over the mutuum adiutorium, which is referred to here as
"conjugal" love). Neither the teaching of Vatican II, see Sacrosanctum Concilium
Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, "Constitutio pastoralis de ecclesia in mundo huius
temporis, Gaudium et Spes," 51 (Die 7 m. decembris a. 1965), 58 AAS 1025 (1966),
nor of Paul VI, see Paulus PP VI, "Litterae Encyclicae Humane Vitae" 12 (Die 25 m.
iullius a. 1968), 60 AAS 481-503, posited a hierarchy of the ends, but the later empha-
sized the inseparable connection between the ends. See also WOJTYLA, supra note 9,
at 302; cf JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION, A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT
BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (1965) (suggesting, prior to Hu-
mane Vitae, that not every act of sexual intercourse need be open to procreation).
41. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 211-216.
42. Id. at 125-26.
43. ARISTOTLE, supra note 37, bk. 8, ch. 12, 1162a; SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra
note 39, III, Supp., q.42, a.4, p. 2717; WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 224-36.
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the sexes, procreation follows from the social nature of the human
person.44 The bestowal of humanity upon those to whom the par-
ents have given life fills the fundamental community with meaning
and purpose. In describing this good, Wojtyla notes that from the
moment of conception, the child presents him or herself for accept-
ance and participation in the community.45 Deeply aware that the
child belongs to them, the parents offer acceptance, care, and edu-
cation to the child.46 As the child discovers his or her humanity,
the family unit develops and matures as a kind of organic and spiri-
tual community.47 Together with siblings, the child and parents
form, what Wojtyla identifies as, a community of human persons.48
The characteristic traits of this fundamental community might be
said to include acceptance, participation, education, commitment
and fulfillment.
The reduction of the marriage to subjective experience stands in
contrast to the natural law tradition in which marriage constitutes
an objective value. 49 The primacy of individual experience over
the objectivity of the fundamental human community has philo-
sophical roots in classical liberal political theory.5° As with the nat-
ural law tradition, it is far beyond the modest scope of this essay to
trace the development and influences of liberal theory.51 Let it suf-
fice that generally liberal theory emphasizes autonomy, individual-
ism, subjectivity, and the relativity of moral value.52 The
44. ARISTOTLE, supra note 37, bk. 8, ch. 14, 1154a.
45. See WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 333.
46. Id. at 332-35.
47. Id. at 333.
48. Id. at 332-33.
49. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 39, III, Supp., q.41, a.1, p. 2711.
50. E.g., Drucilla Cornell, Fatherhood and its Discontents: Men, Patriarchy and
Freedom, in LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA 199
(Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998) (arguing that the law of the state ought not to "privi-
lege or impose one form of family structure or sexuality over another").
51. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-53 (1971) (discussing the
rule of justice); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 27-114 (1981) (ex-
ploring the identity of self); SONG, supra note 7, at 9-48 (offering an interpretation of
liberalism).
52. Liberal theory's emphasis on individualism seems evident in three well-known
twentieth-century cases concerning marriage, procreation and privacy. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court delineated a right of individual privacy
based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). Appealing to the "sacredness" of mar-
riage, the Court struck down a state statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives,
describing the statute as "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship." 381 U.S. at 485. The privacy right protecting the distribution and use of
contraceptives was extended to non-married individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972). This legal reasoning then supplied the justification for the right of a
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seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes expressed this
understanding in its pristine form when he propagated the myth of
Leviathan: the human being in the state of nature as an isolated,
self-interested creature of fear and desire, engaged in a perpetual
state of war with everyone else, and driven into political society
only for the sake of self preservation. 53 When applied to marriage
and family, this image of the autonomous individual is precisely
what gives rise to the primacy of subjective experience over the
organic and spiritual reality of the community of persons that is the
family.54
The family interacts with the larger society by affording the pri-
mary experience of participation in community. For the large
amount of good that it admittedly accomplishes in regulating busi-
ness and rendering government benefits, the liberal state is incapa-
ble of supplying, and perhaps even militates against, a sense of
solidarity and community.5 6 Attempting to retrieve the natural law
tradition, Wojtyla recalls that marriage and the family comprise the
primary community.57  In this regard, Wojtyla's position distin-
woman to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). Thus, the
privacy right, which was claimed to be based on the sacred character of marriage, was
extended to include constitutional protection for individuals to distribute and use con-
traception as well as to perform and have abortions.
53. HOBBES, supra note 25 at 82-84. See also LOCKE, supra note 18, §§ 143-44, at
364-65 (the individual consents to a "social contract" pursuant to which the freedom
of the state of nature is surrendered in order to procure societal protection of the
"natural rights" of life, liberty, and property). Cf JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 4 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (maintaining that
the family was the only "natural society").
54. WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 319.
55. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 217 ("The family is in itself a small society, and the
existence of all large societies - nation, state, Church - depends on it.").
56. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 17-28
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1948). See also R. JACKSON WILSON, IN QUEST OF COMMU-
NITY: SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES 1860-1920 (1968) (criticizing lib-
eral political theory on the ground that it fosters an impersonal and bureaucratic
state, which encourages individual competition to the detriment of societal interests);
WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 276-279 (Suggesting that participation in authentic commu-
nities, as opposed to the modern society, gives rise to words such as "brother," "sis-
ter," and "kinship"). The reason, according to the author, is that authentic
communities such as family, church and other subsidiary structures in society permit
the individual person to experience "participation" rather than "alienation." Id. at
279.
57. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 217-18.
For although marriage in the natural course of things leads to the existence
of a family, and although the possibility that it will do so must always be kept
open, marriage itself is not as a result absorbed by and lost in the family. It
retains its distinct existence as an institution whose inner structure is differ-
ent from that of the family. The family has the structure of a society ....
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guishes "individualism" from "personalism. ' 58 Individualism de-
notes that the human person acts primarily to advance self-interest.
In contrast, personalism refers to the constitution of the human
person through acting in solidarity with others. Personalism posits
the human person as created not for self-interest but for self-tran-
scendence.5 9 This leads to a second distinction, that between alien-
ation and participation.60 Membership in society ought not to be
identified with that participation through which the human person
experiences fulfillment. Such participation is only possible in those
subsidiary structures that facilitate the formation of genuine com-
munity.6 The family is nature's primary structure to facilitate per-
sonalism and participation.
Wojtyla also draws attention to the semantic difference between
the terms "society" and "community," as reflective of the differ-
ence between associational relationships and relationships that en-
tail a deeper level of personal commitment and fulfillment.62 In
Catholic thought, subsidiary structures are considered a necessary
condition for the creation of community. 63 Moreover, it is recog-
Marriage does not posses the structure of a society, but an inter-personal
structure: it is a union and a communion of two persons.
Id.
58. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 271-80.
59. See WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 284-292; see also Veritatis Splendor, supra note
8, at 51 ("This universality does not ignore the individuality of human beings, nor is it
opposed to the absolute uniqueness of each person. On the contrary, it embraces at
its root each of the person's free acts, which are meant to bear witness to the univer-
sality of the true good.").
60. WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 296-99; WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 204-06.
61. The Catholic concept of the common good thus holds that "[c]ollaboration in
the development of the whole person and of every human being is in fact a duty of all
towards all." Thus, the common good with its goal of authentic personal development
mitigates against excessive individualism. "Progressioni totius hominis et omnis
hominis cooperari est officium omnium hominum erga omnes.. ." loannes Paulus Pp.
II, Litterae Encylicae Solicitudo Rei Socialis, 32 (Die 30 m. decembris a. 1987), 80
AAS 545 (1988) (emphasis in original).
62. WOJTYLA, supra note 9, at 277-279.
63. A constitutive element of the Catholic understanding of natural law has been
the concept of the common good. The common good has been defined as "the sum of
those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members
relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment." The Pastoral Constitu-
tion on the Church in the World of Today defines the common good as "summam
eorum vitae socialis condicionum quae turn coetibus, turn singulis membris permittunt
ut propriam perfectionem plenius atque expeditius consequantur." Gaudium et Spes,
supra note 40, at 26. It seems important to point out that the meaning of the common
good in the Catholic tradition is not merely the good of the community. In contrast to
an excessive focus on the community or the individual, the Catholic position assumes
a "genuinely personalistic structure of human existence in a community." Id. at 282
(emphasis in original).
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nized that the human person, as a social being, gravitates for au-
thentic fulfillment to such subsidiary structures. 64 A significant
subsidiary structure is that fundamental community of marriage in
which the members recognize a source of meaning and value.65
Here, personalism, participation, and solidarity flourish. The natu-
ral law tradition holds that the special form of spousal love and the
gift of new human life, which flows from it, constitute an objective
reality upon which the larger society depends for its stability and
well being.
Il. MARRIAGE As VIRTUOUS
The predominance of subjective experience also mitigates the
natural law tradition that marriage is a virtuous relationship.66 In
Wojtyla's words, the contemporary view "proclaims the primacy of
experience over virtue. '67 However, pursuant to the tradition, the
spouses' commitment to the two ends of marriage- conjugal love
and procreation-is virtuous. In Wojytla's analysis, the human
person finds fulfillment when the inner subjective elements of the
person are brought into conformity with the objective and virtuous
social reality through the person's free act of the will.68  When the
human person apprehends the natural goods of marriage in the in-
tellect, the person understands that the basis for marriage is more
than a subjective inner experience.6 9 Rather, marriage exists as an
outer objective social reality that represents virtue for the spouses,
their children, and the larger society. 7° The moral life "calls for
that creativity and originality typical of the person, the source and
cause of his own deliberate acts."' 71 When the human person exer-
cises free will to enter into and to sustain this fundamental commu-
nity, the person acts in accord with natural virtue.
64. Pope Pius XI formulated what has become the classic statement of the princi-
ple of subsidiarity. Pius Pp. XI, "Litterae Encyclicae Quadragesimo Anno (Die 15 m.
maii a. 1931)," 23 AAS 177-228 (1931).
65. FINNIS, supra note 5, at 398-410 (discussing Thomas Aquinas' treatment of nat-
ural law and marriage in SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 41.)
66. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 39, at III, Supp., q.41, a.1, p. 2711; see also
WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 197 ("Virtue can only come from spiritual strength.").
67. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 119.
68. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 39, 111, Supp., q. 41, a. 1, p. 2711. ("[T]hat is
said to be natural to which nature inclines, although it comes to pass through the
intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called
natural; and in this way matrimony is natural. . . .") (emphasis omitted).
69. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 119.
70. Id. at 217.
71. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 8, at 40.
1782
THE THOUGHT OF KAROL WOJTYLA
Liberal theory's emphasis on the autonomous individual results
in a definition of freedom as the absence of government con-
straint.72 Consequently, law is viewed as a constraint placed on in-
dividual freedom. 3 The fact that the state law requires a judicial
judgment to dissolve a valid marriage places a burden on the free-
dom of the individual, who is not able to terminate the marriage at
will by subjective choice. Pursuant to liberal theory, when such a
restriction is justified by societal need, the burden must be the min-
imum necessary in order to produce the underlying purpose of the
restriction. The natural law tradition, in contrast, understands law
not so much as a burden but as an "enabling condition" of free-
dom. The tradition posits no necessary opposition between free-
dom and law. As already discussed, it understands marriage as a
state of life entered into by free choice, which offers the spouses a
deeper meaning.7 4 The meaning is located in the two ends of the
conjugal love and new human life. To abide by this law based on
human nature yields a deeper freedom than that which is available
to the autonomous individual who acts principally to protect self-
interest.
The primacy of subjective experience also results in the relativity
of truth.75 In liberal theory, freedom involves a subjective interpre-
tation of truth. Each person is free to choose his or her own moral
rules.76 In contrast, the natural law tradition recognizes the truth
of marriage not as a matter of speculative knowledge, but instead
on the basis of "practical truth. ' 77 Practical truth is a truth on
which the meaning of one's life is subject.78 In other words, the
day-to-day lived reality and the whole of one's life would be im-
poverished radically in the absence of this truth. Marriage is such a
practical truth as it shapes the destiny of the spouses. This is a
truth that involves contemplation in the intellect, commitment in
72. Alasdair Macintyre, How Can We Learn What "Veritatis Splendor" Has to
Teach, in VERITATIS SPLENDOR AND THE RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY 83-86 (J.
A. DiNoia, & Romanus Cesario, eds. 1999).
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
75. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 119-121. See also Veritatis Splendor, supra note 8,
at 101.
76. See Veritatis Splendor, supra note 8, at 101. Alasdair Maclntyre, How We Can
Learn What "Veritatis Splendor" Has to Teach, in VERITATIS SPLENDOR AND THE RE-
NEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY, supra note 72, at 85.
77. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 39, I, q.16, a.4, p.92; id. at II-I, q.109, a.2,
p.1661; id. at II-II, q. 109, a.3, p.1662.
78. Livio Melina, Desire for Happiness and the Commandments in the First Chap-
ter of "Vertatis Splendor," in VERITAITIS SPLENDOR AND THE RENEWAL OF MORAL
THEOLOGY, supra note 72, at 150.
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the will, and expression with the body.79 To live in accord with the
natural law requires a love for the true good. In living out their
marital vows, the spouses love not only each other as autonomous
individuals but the organic and spiritual reality that is created by
their union.
Wojtyla's analysis retrieves this more profound understanding of
marriage. The analysis starts with an appreciation of the value of
the human person as "its own master" endowed with free will.80
The experience of marital love, according to Wojtyla:
[F]orcibly detaches the person, so to speak, from its natural invi-
olability and inalienability. It makes the person want to do just
that-surrender itself to another, to the one it loves. The person
no longer wishes to be its own exclusive property, but instead to
become the property of that other. This means the renunciation
of its autonomy and its inalienability. Love proceeds by way of
this renunciation, guided by the profound conviction that it does
not diminish or impoverish, but quite the contrary, enlarges and
enriches the existence of the person.81
This paradoxical aspect of marital love flows from the "work of the
will," in which the mutual love of the spouses entices acts of self-
sacrifice for each other and the family as a whole.82 Wojtyla con-
trasts this profound "love that is gift of self" with "the superficial
view of sex."' 83 The superficial view involves "mutual sexual ex-
ploitation" in which the woman gives her body to a man.84 Instead,
the profound love of the spouses in marriage demands the reci-
procity of mutual surrender of both persons. When this love exists,
"the sensual and emotional experiences which are so vividly pre-
sent in the consciousness" of marital union constitute the "outward
gauge" of the self-giving of the persons.85 The natural law tradition
recognizes that the self-gift of the spouses to each other as well as
the sacrifices made by the parents for children constitute marriage
and family life as virtuous.
CONCLUSION
Prompted by the high rate of divorce that now characterizes
American society, this essay has attempted to retrieve certain as-
79. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 195-208.
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id. at 125-26.
82. Id. at 126.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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pects of the natural law tradition about the meaning and purposes
of marriage. The tradition understands the ends of marriage as the
conjugal union of the spouses and the procreation and education of
children. It sees marriage as a natural and virtuous relationship
that elicits the gift of self from each of the spouses. It recognizes
that natural goods of marriage lead to the family unity, which is the
fundamental community of society. In light of the tradition, I offer
two practical suggestions related to the issue of counseling clients
who are thinking about divorce.
First, the attorney needs to understand his or her role as a "coun-
selor-at-law." Certainly, the role of the attorney is not to serve as a
therapist, minister, or social worker.8 6 The attorney should realize,
nonetheless, that a client who is faced with the possibility of di-
vorce may be in a somewhat confused and vulnerable state of
mind.87 It may well be the case that referral to a religious and/or
psychological counselor represents an important part of the pro-
cess leading to an informed decision about the legal status of the
client's marriage and family. The law of many states contemplates
that prior to a final decree of dissolution, the parties experience a
"cooling-off" period in which to view the situation in as balanced a
way as possible under the circumstances of the case. 88 The legisla-
tive intent of such laws is not to create a culture of divorce, but to
facilitate reconciliation and keep families together when possible.89
In accord with these considerations, the natural law tradition af-
fords the attorney a historical background and perspective from
which to counsel the client about legal options.
Second, law schools might consider including the natural law
perspective in courses that deal with domestic relations and family
law.90 It is not a matter of imposing a certain value system upon
law students. The natural law understanding of marriage is of sig-
86. Kenneth Kressel et. al., A Provisional Typology of Lawyer Attitudes Towards
Divorce Practice; Gladiators, Advocates, Counselors and Journeymen, in READINGS IN
FAMILY LAW 123 (Frederica K. Lombard ed., 1990) (distinguishing between family
law attorneys either as counselors, who prefer a psychological and interpersonal ap-
proach, or advocates, who aim for the correct tactics to achieve victory for the client).
87. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 213 (1991) (noting a distinction between lawyers who focus
on the client's autonomy in reaching decisions and those who adopt a more paternal-
istic view in guiding the client's decision-making process).
88. E.g., N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (5)-(6) (McKinney 2001).
89. E.g., Sinha v. Sinha, 526 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1987) (finding that the goal of rec-
onciliation that underlies the divorce law justifies the separation period of three years
prior to a unilateral divorce).
90. John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037,
1040-41 (1992) (discussing the important role of natural law in Catholic law schools).
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nificant importance to academic discussion of the family, if for no
other reason than that the tradition has played such a central his-
torical role in defining the institution of marriage in our society. It
seems questionable that a student would complete a course about
family law that culminates in the degree of Doctor of Law (Juris
Doctor) and have never heard about the role of natural law in the
historical development of the subject matter. The numerous law
schools that have a Catholic tradition should be especially con-
cerned to present the natural law tradition, as it has been an impor-
tant component of the Catholic intellectual heritage.
In this brief overview of the tradition, I have drawn heavily on
the philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyla. Consistent with the
natural law tradition, Wojtyla's writings are primarily philosophical
and are usually not appeals to the revelation of a specific religious
tradition. In our pluralistic society, this kind of philosophical
thinking affords hope in the face of skepticism about the possibili-
ties for common agreement on the nature and ends of marriage.
The fact that Wojtyla emerged as the Successor to the Apostle Pe-
ter in the Catholic community should only enhance the importance
of his pre-papal philosophical thought to the ongoing discussion
about marriage in a society in which broken marriages have be-
come all too common place.
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